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ABSTRACT
An investment in the object as unquestionably self-evident and self-defining has
for quite some time now been widely critiqued as a central philosophical tenet
of crony capitalism in its current economic, material, social, cultural and
institutional manifestations. In this article, I trace that appeal to the category
of the object in order to claim its discursive presence also in recent critical
tendencies in literary criticism in relation to science, specifically evolutionary
psychology and its underpinning neuro- and cognitive science. I focus my
explorations through the 2010–2012 debate about ‘Literary Darwinism’ in the
American journal Critical Inquiry and some selected articles from a 2008
special double-issue of the Journal of Beckett Studies on ‘Beckett, Language
and the Mind’, arguing that both illustrate typical, core issues and problems in
the critical discourses about science and literature, specifically how both the
literary criticism and the science that is drawn on to support it are
nevertheless all made to be rooted in a world of an agreed liberal, political
and ideological commitment to a subject assumed as an autonomous agent
with a transparent consciousness and language to match.
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An investment in the object as unquestionably self-evident and self-defining
has for quite some time now been critiqued as a central philosophical tenet of
crony capitalism in its current economic, material, social, cultural and insti-
tutional manifestations.1 In this article, I want to trace that appeal to the cat-
egory of the object in order to claim its discursive presence with (or power
over) ‘real things’ also in recent critical tendencies in literary criticism in
relation to science, specifically evolutionary psychology and its underpinning
neuro- and cognitive science.2 Through my exploration I will also argue how
these tendencies in literary studies and neuroscience rest on a repression of a
history of specific philosophical and theoretical debates. Claude Lévi-Strauss
formulated this repressed history and history of repression as follows:
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Every effort to understand destroys the object studied in favour of another
object of a different nature; this second object requires from us a new effort
which destroys it in favour of a third, and so on and so forth until we reach
the one lasting presence, the point at which the distinction between meaning
and the absence of meaning disappears; the same point from which we
began. It is 2,500 years since men first discovered and formulated these
truths. In the interval, we have found nothing new, except – as we have tried
to turn all possible ways out of the dilemma – so many additional proofs of
the conclusion that we would have liked to avoid.3
To work through the implications of Levi-Strauss’s history of histories for the
claims of literary studies and neuroscience, I focus my explorations here
through two examples: the 2010–2012 debate about ‘Literary Darwinism’ in
the American journal Critical Inquiry4 and some selected articles from a
2008 special double-issue of the Journal of Beckett Studies on ‘Beckett,
Language and the Mind’.5 I have chosen what may seem to be debates with
quite different focuses precisely in order to argue that they are in key ways
more similar than they may appear: ﬁrst, both the Critical Inquiry debate
and the Journal of Beckett Studies special issue claim for themselves a position
at the cutting-edge of new scholarship and academic developments, pointing
the way forward to what is seen by them to be desirable or even inevitable
about the future study and role of literature, both academically and in the
wider society and culture, and speciﬁcally in relation to new scientiﬁc develop-
ments.6 They are by no means alone, of course, in seeing this as an important
way forward for humanities and literary studies: ‘Science in Culture’ is, after all,
one of the four currentmain themes of theUK’s Arts andHumanities Research
Council, which argues that ‘[s]ituated in a radically different research para-
digm, the arts and humanities bring knowledge not normally covered by
science’.7 In contrast to such claims of ‘radical difference’, I argue here that
in such critical discourses deployed about science and literature and the
relationship between the two, both the literary criticism and the science are
rooted in an agreed liberal, political and ideological commitment to a subject
assumed as an autonomous agent with a transparent consciousness and
language to match and its accompanying autonomous, independent, self-con-
stituted, ‘object’. As my quotation from Levi-Strauss demonstrates, this is not a
new area of consideration, but all the more reason, I argue, to ask why and how
it is now being ignored as such in the kinds of arguments I turn to here.
To begin with, then, I turn to the debate about Literary Darwinismwhich was
extensively engaged with in a lively manner in the pages of Critical Inquiry. ‘Lit-
erary Darwinism’8 has been defined by one of its founders, Joseph Carroll, as
integrat[ing] literary concepts with a modern evolutionary understanding of
the evolved and adapted characteristics of human nature.[…] aim[ing] not
just at being one more “school” or movement in literary theory [… but] at fun-
damentally transforming the framework for all literary study.9
2 K. LESNIK-OBERSTEIN
The concern of the Critical Inquiry debate was how claims about evolution are
exactly understood in scientiﬁc terms and the ensuing implications for
whether and how evolution might indeed be relevant to ‘the framework for
literary study’. This was by no means the ﬁrst of such debates; ‘such talk is
not new’, as Jonathan Kramnick, whose 2011 article ‘Against Literary Darwin-
ism’ instigated the Critical Inquiry debate, himself points out in his response
to his critics.10 I want here, however, to illustrate through examining the
speciﬁc terms of this debate how Literary Darwinism is currently by no
means a lone voice, but part of a broader, pervasive, anti-theoretical tendency
in wider literary and scientiﬁc studies; as Carlo Salzani, amongst others, has
argued, in his review of Joseph Carroll’s book Reading Human Nature,
This dialogue de sourds extends far beyond the borders of Literary Darwinism
and characterizes the old opposition between natural sciences and humanities,
which had an explosion – mainly in American academia – with the ‘Science
Wars’ of the 1990s […], but still rages in the contemporary debate about the
‘crisis of the humanities’.11
Indeed, Jonathan Kramnick’s own arguments, however rigorous and scholarly
in their attempts to clarify speciﬁc scientiﬁc theories of evolution and their
possible relation to literary studies, nevertheless avoid the implications of
prior questioning of the status of ‘science’ or ‘texts’ in their own right; this
is also the case for several of the articles in ‘Beckett, Language and the
Mind’. In short, I raise the question here about how and why whole recent
– and ongoing – debates about science and literary studies, about ‘interdisci-
plinarity’ and its (im)possibilities and about ‘the history of theories of mind’,12
manage to take place in strictly liberal-humanist terms;13 that is to say, for all
the scrupulous open-mindedness often on display, deconstruction is, appar-
ently, the – as it were – ‘theory of mind’ whose name dare not be spoken.14
The central question for me here is not whether Literary Darwinism in and
of itself is legitimate or not, but why deconstructive approaches in this par-
ticular debate are apparently relegated a priori to illegitimacy? Why and
how are they not included in the debate? (Isn’t that what a ‘debate’ is supposed
to be?); all the more as this has in many senses always been, in fact, their
debate par excellence? Kramnick, in defence of literary studies, for instance
refers his critics to the
Recent years [which] have seen a vibrantly eclectic curiosity in quantitative,
empirical, and otherwise novel approaches to literary study, from the digital
humanities to the cognitive sciences to affect theory and beyond. To say that
the business is theory-besotted and averse to things scientific is, to borrow an
expression from Joseph Carroll, ‘boxing at shadows’.15
Kramnick’s defence attempts to be conciliatory towards the Literary Darwin-
ists by demonstrating a broader, sincere, interest in and receptivity to science
on the part of literary studies; but what may seem to be a concession merely, in
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fact – advertently or inadvertently – constitutes a full surrender, for an
accepted division between the ‘theory besotted’ and ‘things scientiﬁc’ which
are, here, ‘quantitative, empirical, […] digital […] cognitive sciences to
affect theory and beyond’ conﬁrms ‘science’ as in the business of quantiﬁable
and natural, spontaneous objects of available scrutiny, in opposition to a
‘theory’which is therefore, willy-nilly, to quote Joseph Carroll ‘creative, specu-
lative thought’ not ‘serious, real knowledge, constructive knowledge’.16 And
with this conﬁrmation, for all the battles Kramnick wins in terms of persist-
ently clarifying arguments and settling scholarly points, his war is in fact
already lost and the debate is necessarily determined to being recapitulated
in these terms precisely, returning to the site of the crime in reviewing repeat-
edly which scientiﬁc claim, under this deﬁnition of ‘science’, is the most
logical, the best ‘real knowledge’. And this is not to say that such recapitulative
debates are not in their own right admirable and necessary within those liberal
terms, and will undoubtedly continue as such too, but to suggest that the
terms can be different. As Vicki Kirby writes in her book on deconstruction
and science, Quantum Anthropologies:
When Derrida reminds his audience that deconstruction’s implications could
not be confined to philosophy any more than they could be restricted
between the covers of a book, perhaps the most provocative consequence of
such clarifications is that the reader/ writer of this ‘general text’ is necessarily
dispersed – it is not located, at least not in any classical sense, in a human
agent. Within this ‘open system’ whose only constant is mutation/ writing,
the same questions that are confronted in the physical sciences about determi-
nation, agency, causality, space-time involvement, and ‘spooky’ entanglement,
are all operative.17
It is Kirby’s aim, as it has been of several other notable deconstructionists
over many years,18 to explain how it is just as much – if I may (mis)quote
Kramnick quoting Carroll – ‘boxing at shadows’ ‘to say that [deconstruction]
is averse to things scientific’. It can be stated at this point that one of the
several reasons that deconstruction is a priori absent or dismissed from the
debate as held here is that the rage against ‘theory’ of the Literary Darwinists
– but, significantly, as we will see also with respect to the articles on Beckett,
not just the Literary Darwinists – is precisely fired by the fact that they all
understand deconstruction somehow to ‘evaporate’ a world of natural,
material subjects and objects; as Carroll argues, ‘poststructuralism yields
causal primacy to language’, which for Carroll, as Carlo Salzani points out,
means ‘it is incompatible with a “perspective in which ‘life’, self-replicating
DNA, precedes thought, to say nothing of language”’.19 Kramnick quotes
Brian Boyd as similarly asserting that ‘humans are not just cultural or
textual phenomena but something more complex’,20 and goes on to argue
that ‘[t]he important part of this sentence is not the routine invective
against jargon and politics so much as the reference to humans as “something
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more complex” than mere textual entities’.21 What is significant to my inter-
ests here is that Kramnick then does not, however, take the opportunity – as
he might have – to question the ‘mereness’ and/of that ‘textual’, but instead
immediately turns to his defence of literary studies’ real interest in ‘science’
through claiming that, in fact, Boyd is wrong to downplay ‘the lively state
of play [in the Humanities] on topics dear to many Literary Darwinists,
including especially ideas of mate selection, differential kin preferences, and
innate sexual predispositions’,22 as well as what Kramnick sees as the
several developing ‘novel approaches’.
These a priori assumptions about science, the natural and the material con-
tinue to be most exposed at, again, what are ostensibly precisely open-minded
moments in the debate, such as when G. Gabrielle Starr on the one hand help-
fully implies that Literary Darwinism’s accounts of ‘theory’ are dubious when
she queries ‘whether [the] criticisms [of scholars like Carroll and Jonathan
Gottschall of poststructuralist theorizing] are valid’, but, on the other hand,
Starr herself simultaneously dismisses further consideration of any kind of
‘poststructuralist theorising’ in asserting that, anyway, ‘the work of literary
scholars [now] goes beyond’ it.23 In line with this claim to progression,
Starr also finds herself in agreement with Joseph Carroll in criticising literary
scholars for ‘rely[ing] on theories of mind (like those of psychoanalysis) that
have been generally supplanted in modern psychology’, where Starr assumes
that ‘cognitive neuroscience’ has superseded psychoanalysis.24 Similarly,
Blakey Vermeule thoughtfully confesses how she
used to worry about [what evolutionary psychology has to do with literary
study] even more (and with much more reason) when our field was given
over to psychoanalysis, a fascinating rival case. As a theory, psychoanalysis is
undeniably rich.25
But immediately follows this with the conclusion that ‘[a]s a story about the
mind, however, it is laughable’.26 Vermeule’s assertion assumes a ‘psychoana-
lysis’ under the same banner as the supposedly science-averse ‘theory’, and I
can use her somewhat throw-away conclusion to invoke the important his-
torical parallel and, sometimes, signiﬁcant overlap, between the long-
running and extensive debates around the ‘scientiﬁc’ status of psychoanalysis
and the relationships between deconstruction and science, both of which in
fact put into question the liberal deﬁnition of ‘science’ that all contributors
to this particular debate rely on tout court.
Modernism scholar Daniela Caselli analyses what is at stake in such
matters when she writes in relation specifically to the ‘affect theory’ also men-
tioned by Kramnick as one of the ‘novel approaches’ in literary studies that:
feminist theory, and theory in general, are focused [at this historical point] on a
process of self-criticism aimed, on the one hand, at questioning past methodo-
logical rigidities identified as the attachment to epistemology over ontology, the
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centrality of estrangement over affective identification, and the alleged dogma
of constructivism, and, on the other, at engaging with areas of thought per-
ceived as having remained for decades no entry zones, such as science (in par-
ticular neuroscience) and affect.27
Signiﬁcantly, Caselli adds that the
elusive quality of affect [… is] essential to its promise of transcending notions of
otherness, both within and without the self. Affect promises – creatively – to go
beyond what theory – boringly – has been able to examine so far, and brings
with this the allure of immediacy.28
Where Kramnick critiques Literary Darwinists on their own grounds with a
lack of evidence, argument, or satisfaction of ‘at least some criteria’,29
Caselli reads what such claims are themselves about; what they are invoked
to achieve and secure, regardless of whether, or how, they may also be
somehow ‘provable’ (or not) as ‘true’.
Caselli in her critique of affect, puzzles, as I do here too, over the issue of
‘lost’ or ‘forgotten’ prior deconstructive – and in this case, significantly, also
psychoanalytic – arguments which already long-previously critiqued a pro-
posed ‘new’ turn of affect theory when she points out that feminist, psycho-
analytic scholars ‘Jacqueline Rose and Juliet Mitchell in the late 1970s and
early 1980s were already illustrating the problems encountered in attempting
to theorize femininity as beyond the symbolic’.30 Rose and Mitchell challenge
the ‘mereness’ of ‘textuality’ (through the ‘symbolic’ in this quotation), in the
way that, as I noted earlier, Kramnick does not. It is not coincidental that
another theorist whose work is at the heart of these issues, in a certain
sense, above all with respect to Literary Darwinism specifically, is also a fem-
inist critic, and one never mentioned in the exchanges in Critical Inquiry:
Donna Haraway argued in her classic 1989 book Primate Visions that these
debates are because of, and about, the particular political relevance and
moment of Western late-capitalism, where object-fetishism ironically unites
many of both the critics and the supporters of the present state of affairs;
as critic Neil Cocks puts it, adapting Jacqueline Rose’s formulations about
the child,
neuroscientific accounts of […] cognition recover and maintain thought as
scan, brain and figure: an object of scrutiny and exchange. Therefore, these cog-
nitivist studies are about the desire for a possibility of a return to a point of pure
origin in a past where there was no split between language and object.31
These arguments are necessarily opened-up for Haraway, as for Rose and
Mitchell, by feminism,
as in all feminist senses, gender cannot mean simply the cultural appropriation
of biological sexual difference; indeed sexual difference is itself the more funda-
mental cultural construction. And even that sense of sexual difference is not
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enough for feminist theory; gender is woven of asymmetrical and multiply
arrayed difference, charged with the currents of power surging through
multi-faceted dramatic narratives of domination and struggles for its end.32
Haraway’s arguments fundamentally disrupt the ‘science’ versus ‘literary’ – or
‘real’ versus ‘fantasy’/‘ﬁction’ – opposition that ultimately, in this sense, scup-
pers Kramnick, for all his careful side-stepping of it through attempts at gentle
modiﬁcation. Haraway argues that
The history of science appears as a narrative about the history of technical and
social means to produce the facts. The facts themselves are types of stories, of
testimony to experience. But the provocation of experience requires an elabor-
ate technology – including physical tools, an accessible tradition of interpret-
ation, and specific social relations. Not just anything can emerge as a fact;
not just anything can be seen or done, and so told. Scientific practice may be
considered a kind of story-telling practice – a rule-governed, constrained, his-
torically changing craft of narrating the history of nature.[…] To treat a science
as a narrative is not to be dismissive, quite the contrary.33
It is relevant to note in the context of this whole debate that Haraway herself,
as with many of the feminist theorists of science of her generation (whatever
their precise perspectives on the implications of feminism for science), is a
trained laboratory scientist,34 in her case both a developmental biologist
and a primatologist. Her doctoral thesis, published as Crystals, Fabrics and
Fields: Metaphors that Shape Embryos35 is described in biologist Scott
F. Gilbert’s ‘Foreword’ for its 2004 re-publication as being able to help
newly minted developmental biologists [working in the three new disciplines of
evolutionary developmental biology, ecological developmental biology and
medical developmental biology] to understand the morphogenesis of their dis-
cipline [and i]t should reconnect the new developmental biology with the older
embryology.36
I make this point because I want to argue too that Kramnick’s (and the
further debate-contributors’, as well as some of the Beckettians’, as we shall
see later) hopeful figuration of ‘interdisciplinarity’ as a future consummation
devoutly to be wished, is in more ways than one a ship that sailed long-ago
once the feminist and deconstructivist views discussed here hive back in to
view. It is, in fact, ironically, the upholding of the liberal view of science as
not always anyway about perspectives, but in the end indeed about self-con-
stituted objects, vision and natural facts, that creates the very split that ‘inter-
disciplinarity’ is invoked to heal. As Vicki Kirby explains:
by taking Derrida’s notion of an ‘open system’ to its logical conclusion, the
senses of particularism – whether individual subjects, words, methodologies,
or even systems – lose their identifying outlines as entities or atomic individua-
tions that communicate, or relate to each other, with causal effect. Instead they
can be read as different expressions of the same phenomenon.37
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And as theorist Geoff Bennington wrote in 1999 (about the declamation then
already, or again, of a state of ‘post theory’):
Post-theory we all do very different things, but they’re all the same, because they
all proclaim difference. That […] is the call more or less concealed and more or
less encouraged by recent, post-theoretical appeals to difference as value. […]
Interdisciplinarity has become a watchword for a soft historicist cultural
idealism.38
In the light of warnings such as Bennington’s about ‘interdisciplinarity’ as
secured by known separations that are merely to be bridged, it might be noted
that the contributors to these debates may well end up very unpleasantly sur-
prised when they proclaim their wish to leap forward in to this bright new
world of ‘interdisciplinarity’ between ‘science’ and ‘literary studies’, while,
advertently or inadvertently, continuing to participate in the exclusion from
debate of certain differences from the differences they have already all
agreed on. For they may well find that they will not end up, in fact, seducing
the hand that feeds them by obediently transforming their ‘literary objects’,
through the supplement of a late-Capitalist, consumerist ‘science’, in to effec-
tive reproductions, but instead that it will turn out that they are licking the
hand that beats them, to the impoverishment both of themselves and of the
‘disciplines’ they are so anxious, one way or another, to preserve.
I now turn to drawing out the similarities between the debate around Lit-
erary Darwinism as I have read it above, and several articles in the special
double-issue of the Journal of Beckett Studies on ‘Beckett, Language and the
Mind’. If Literary Darwinism may, after all, seem to be a somewhat a minority
interest in literary studies, Beckett criticism may seem an unlikely area in
which to locate an anti-theoretical tendency, let alone a liberal conception
of unitary subjects and objects: Beckett’s work is widely regarded precisely
as engaging in a ‘radical decentering of the human subject’39 and as inspiring
a great deal of highly theoretical criticism in its own right due to its minim-
alism, its openness to interpretation and its challenging of literary traditions.
Nevertheless, just as with Kramnick’s seemingly innocuous arguments about
the ‘vibrantly eclectic curiosity in quantitative, empirical, and otherwise novel
approaches to literary study’,40 Elizabeth Barry, in her introduction to the
Journal of Beckett Studies special issue, claims that:
the empirical discoveries [in neuroscience] are only part of the impetus to
explore the relations between language and thought in Beckett’s work. Newly
discovered conceptual relations between the disciplines of neuroscience, psy-
choanalysis and literary studies, and the new scholarly directions being
forged by our contributors in this respect, have opened up some of the most
suggestive avenues in Beckett criticism to be seen for some time. We are at a
new threshold in Beckett studies, in short, that this volume hopes to mark.41
The ‘empirical’ returns further when Barry, in discussing Lois Oppenheim’s
contribution to the special issue, describes Oppenheim’s article as introducing
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‘a new discipline [neuro-psychoanalysis] which can describe subjective
experience and relate mental function to the brain by uniting the empirical
data of neuroscientiﬁc research with the clinical evidence of psychodynamic
study’.42 Science here unquestioningly is tied to an ‘empirical’ which is the
producer of ‘data’ and to an objectivity necessarily in opposition to ‘subjective
experience’. In Barry’s terms, then, ‘subjective experience’ can be turned into
the objective by ‘uniting’ what was previously separated: ‘empirical data’ and
‘clinical evidence’ and ‘mental function’ and ‘the brain’. In turn, these aspects
are what mark a ‘new threshold in Beckett studies’.
Science, then, as in the Literary Darwinism debate, is already defined in
liberal terms which of themselves determine its function and contributions.
This alignment between the Literary Darwinism debate and the ‘Beckett,
Language and the Mind’ discussions can be further followed in, for instance,
Peter Fifield’s arguments that:
The neuropsychological correlative is valuable not only for the fresh perspective
it delivers upon Beckett’s work but as a corrective for the naiveties of earlier cri-
ticism. […] Neuropsychology, however, with its substantial models and exten-
sive clinical evidence, re-locates the Beckettian post-obit text from its more
abstract interpretations into the realm of substantial empirical enquiry.43
Moreover, this ‘substantial empirical enquiry’ for Fiﬁeld will serve as a ‘cor-
rective’ to a ‘deconstruction and post-structuralism’ which are by Fiﬁeld
characterised as an ‘insistence that language functions as an impersonal
system of relations of deferral’ which ‘is born with its own naivety; namely,
the failure to account for the resounding humanity of even the most radically
self-doubting texts’.44 Barry, Oppenheim and Fiﬁeld’s turn to a science of
empiricism and data, which in their view can transform a groundless and
speculative subjectivity into a substantive and consistent objectivity, therefore
allows for a rejection of a deconstruction claimed to be about language ‘as an
impersonal system’ and about ‘abstract interpretations’which cannot ‘account
for the resounding humanity’, echoing Brian Boyd’s similar rejection of
deconstruction on the grounds that ‘humans are not just cultural or textual
phenomena but something more complex’.45 In these views, interestingly
and in some senses paradoxically, ‘humanity’ is located not in subjectivity
and self-doubt, but in an objectivity which is claimed to be ‘more complex’
than ‘cultural or textual phenomena’, while at the same time also being
about language as somehow ‘personal’ and not about a ‘system’. At stake
here seems to be a conception of humanity which is about some kind of
pure emotion, which is in turn part of a language seen to be deeply personal.
However, such emotion and language are at the same time claimed to be
known objectively: inevitably true for all as scientiﬁc and empirical data,
which are themselves, therefore, neither cultural nor textual phenomena,
nor abstract, nor impersonal systems.
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These invoked oppositions between the abstract and concrete, between the
empirical and non-empirical and the ‘impersonal’ (or ‘just cultural and textual
phenomena’) and ‘humanity’ also recur in understandings of the body, as
Ulrika Maude concludes:
Beckett’s representations of suffering and the body’s inherently deviant dispo-
sition [… foreground] the embodied and material nature of language. Through
the incessant falling, crawling, trembling and ticing, all of which bring the body
ever closer to earth, Beckettian characters are ceaselessly reminded of their own
inescapable materiality.46
For all the ways in which Maude praises Beckett’s work for turning ‘to these
forms of motility and utterance precisely for the manner in which they fore-
ground contingency, defy coherent syntax, cast agency into doubt and ques-
tion received notions of dualism, agency and subjectivity itself’,47 her
formulations nevertheless throughout rely on a retrieved consistency,
dualism and agency through that known and knowable ‘inherently deviant
disposition’, ‘embodiment’ and ‘materiality’. Moreover, this embodiment
and materiality is, as with Fiﬁeld, linked to a non-abstraction, here through
the notion of the ‘everyday’: ‘Motility in Beckett, in other words, lacks the
kind of transparency it tends to have in literature, including modernist
writing such as Joyce’s or Lawrence’s, or indeed that it has in our everyday
lives’.48 This ‘transparency’ also establishes a normed body against which
abnormalities can be viewed as such, validating the reading of ‘Tourette’s’
as visible disability. It is of this ‘body’, which has been and continues to be
so often overtly questioned but yet consistently, often inadvertently, reinstated
nevertheless, that Judith Butler famously writes that she is repeatedly pressed
to admit after all
to a bodily life that could not be theorized away.[…] restored to that bodily
being which is, after all, considered to be most real, most pressing, most unde-
niable.[…] And if I persisted in this notion that bodies were in some way con-
structed, perhaps I really thought that words alone had the power to craft bodies
from their own linguistic substance? Couldn’t someone simply take me aside?49
The liberal investment Butler addresses as a material, ﬂeshly, suffering body
that can speak itself, outside and beyond language, situates the Liberal Dar-
winists’ anti-theory as it does Fiﬁeld’s ‘humanity’, and the ‘empiricism’ of
Barry, Oppenheim, Maude and Fiﬁeld and all the partakers in the Critical
Inquiry debate as well as much more widely.
If the mind-body dualism, then, is advertently or inadvertently upheld as
part of the investment in a world-beyond-text, then there is another impor-
tant aspect to these liberal arguments which does not just ground the position
of the Literary Darwinists and the ‘literary neuroscientists’, but also the work
of the neuroscientists themselves. For not only do literary scholars draw on
neuroscience in an attempt to make their field ‘new’, but the neuroscientists
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draw on literature and ideas of the literary in their own work in turn, so
making a closed loop of assumptions and arguments that feed in to each
other. Maude, for instance, cites the famous popularizer of neuroscience,
Oliver Sacks, in defining Tourette’s Syndrome:
In fact, the very distinction between motor activities, poetic language and
language pathologies has been rendered problematic by recent neuro-anatom-
ical research. For while language involves various areas of the cortex, such as
Broca’s area in the neocortex and Wernicke’s area in the posterior cortex, the
involvement of subcortical regions of the brain – areas that also control
motor activities and affect – suggests that the ‘fascinations with the sounds
and rhythms of language, with rhymes and repetitions, with its chants and
interpersonal powers’, the very driving forces of poetic language, also ‘haunt
the terrible and involuntary utterances of Tourette’s syndrome in its powerful
connections between motor activity and phonic activity’ (Schleifer, 564). In
Tourette’s, which is characterised by an overt ‘excitement of the emotions
and the passions, a disorder of the primal, instinctual bases of behaviour, the
disturbance seems to lie in the very highest parts of the “old brain”: the thala-
mus, hypothalamus, limbic system and amygdala, where the basic affective and
instinctual determinants of personality are lodged’.50
Notable here are the inclusion by Maude of ‘affect’ as ‘controlled’ by an ‘area’,
thus rendering it an independent, autonomous brain function or response, as
well as the assumption of such a thing as ‘poetic language’ by both Maude and
Schleifer which has as its ‘very driving forces’ ‘the sounds and rhythms of
language, with rhymes and repetitions, with its chants and interpersonal
powers’.51 These ‘very driving forces’ are assumed in turn to be about ‘an
overt “excitement of the emotions and the passions […] the basic affective
and instinctual determinants of personality”’. This ‘poetic language’ and its
unquestioned forces, structures, ‘fascinations’ and ‘interpersonal powers’
rely on the classic liberal-humanist vision of literature – and above all,
poetry – as being about the deepest and most powerful human emotions. It
is entirely in line with such redemptive hopes for the interdisciplinary
project of literature and neuroscience that the liberal dream is now vested
in the brain itself; the brain as guarantor of a trans-historical and trans-cul-
tural, innately correct response to literature and poetry, safe out of the
reach of the simultaneously frigid impersonality and ﬂighty irrelevances of
post-modernity. As Oppenheim writes:
While mirror neurons have been located only in the cortex, on the outer surface
of the brain in the so-called action systems, it is believed that either they send
messages to the sub-cortical emotional (limbic) system to allow us to feel what
others feel or that they are also to be found in the emotional system of the brain
[…] Either way, an understanding of the neurobiology of shared emotion
(empathy) is thus close at hand […] the representation of self and other under-
lying that intersubjectivity may be more direct or immediate and less symbolic
or cognitively encoded than previously assumed.52
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‘Mirror neurons’ here also guarantee ‘interpersonal powers’, now between
person and person, who already are known to be able to feel the same feelings
as one another through an ‘empathy’ which cannot neutrally distinguish
between action and perception, or between self and other, even while those
distinctions can be made elsewhere. The perspective which can identify and
‘match’ the feelings as the ‘same’ is never questioned in ‘mirror neuron’
research, just as the nature and powers of ‘poetic language’ are not questioned
here. As scientists Pierre Jacob and Marc Jeannerod, for instance, assert even
as they critique aspects of mirror neuron theory,
[o]ne way to question the motor theory of social cognition would be to chal-
lenge it to account for the human capacity to read one’s own mind or to
ascribe false beliefs to others – something that healthy human adults do all
the time without effort.53
‘Healthy humans’ are assumed here as ‘mind readers’ of both themselves and
others without question.
It is not coincidental, in this context, that Maude and Fifield both
directly reference not only Oliver Sacks, but also the neuroscientist V.S.
Ramachandran. Ramanchandran, like Sacks, is well-known in non-scientific
circles, not least for the invention of the ‘mirror box’ to address ‘phantom
limb’ pain (although more recent research has in fact cast doubt on its effec-
tiveness.54) Ramachandran relies, as Maude, Fifield, Oppenheim and the
Literary Darwinists do, on unquestioned assumptions about the powers of
literature, poetic language and the nature of interpersonal communication,
including the empathy of ‘mirror neurons’. In discussing what distinguishes
human language from that of animals, for instance, Ramachandran states that
[o]nly humans, as far as we know, can use metaphor and analogy [… the male
ape’s use of metaphor] falls far short of puns or poems, or of Tagore’s descrip-
tion of the Taj Mahal as a ‘tear drop on the cheek of time’.55
This assumption about metaphor in turn underpins research on, for instance,
autism, which according to Ramachandran and several other researchers
involves having ‘difﬁculty with metaphor’. Linking the difﬁculty with meta-
phor to ‘mirror neurons’ leads further to the suggestion that ‘the mirror-
neuron system in humans is involved not only in interpreting skilled
actions but in understanding action metaphors and, indeed, in other
aspects of embodied cognition’. It may be noted that ‘embodiment’ occurs
here also, again understood, much as in Maude’s claims quoted previously,
to be about ‘human thought [being] deeply shaped by its interconnection
with the body and by the inherent nature of human sensory and motor pro-
cesses’.56 Importantly, the accounts of metaphor here produce the situation, as
Amit Pinchevski observes, that ‘the variety of characteristics used to describe
autism may therefore reveal the medico-clinical-scientiﬁc stance […] as
intrinsically equating normalcy with effective communication’.57
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In tracing the way that these claims in literary studies and neuroscience rely
on shared liberal beliefs about the object and the subject as the human,
language, literature and communication, I have read investments as produ-
cing and shaping beliefs about both science and literature. Within this
science and literature, however, this is not seen to be about beliefs, but
about the truth which will bring the ‘new’ to both disciplines. I read this
‘new’ not as new, but as a recapitulation of very old debates which revolve
around the status of perspective, objects, science, language and the world. I
can, ironically, only make these claims because I read perspective as inevitable
and inescapable, in line with prior thinkers such as Lévi-Strauss, Derrida,
Haraway, Felman, Judith Butler and Jacqueline Rose, who have not been
included in the debates I have read here. I cannot, however, claim the
reading of perspective as itself truth, as the objectivity overcoming subjectiv-
ity,58 a separation dissolved into what the philosopher Thomas Nagel called
the ‘view from nowhere’.59
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